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To connecl Chrisl and the birth of modern science may sound a jarring note in 
this posl-Chrislian age of science. Not a few devoutly Christian scientists would be 
surprised on being told about such a connection. Non-Christian scientists, who 
make up the vast majority of the body scientific all over the world, would dismiss 
the idea out of hand. In doing so they would echo the reply which Darwin sent in 
1879 to the third letter written to him by W . Mengden, a 17-year-old student in 
Germany.' 
By 1879, Darwin had for more than forty years turned his back on Christian 
faith which he identified with a strictly literal interpretation of the Bible and espe-
cially of its creation story. So long an alienation from Christian faith blinded Dar-
win to the fact that with his reply he gave his own answer to Christ's historic ques-
tion, ·And you, who do you say I am?" 
In his first two letters the young student asked Darwin whether evolution was 
compatible with belief in God. The ambiguity of Darwin's replies evidently 
prompted young Mcngden to pose similar questions to Ernst Haeckel, who had for 
some time been Darwin's chief champion in the German-speaking world. Haeckel, 
as reported by Mengden in his third letter to Darwin (dated June 2, 1879), had 
agreed with Darwin that belief in God was compatible with holding the theory of 
evolution. In his reply to the young student, Haeckel chose to be ambiguous with 
respect to the personal character of God, although this was not allowed within 
Haeckel 's pantheistic monism. Much less did Haeckel refer to the materialist char-
acter of evolution as he and Darwin held it. It was, however, with no ambiguity 
that Haeckel described his and Darwin's views on Christ: *He [Darwin] cannot be-
lieve in the supernatural:· 
Mengden reported this to Darwin because he felt that no one, apart from Dar-
win, could help him *to get hold of the truth." The truth had Christ as its central 
point for the young student who displayed a penetrating insight by posing, in the 
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same breath, two questions. One was whether one could believe in Christ as de-
scribed in the Bible, the other concerned the definition of God that could be held 
by one who accepted Darwin's theory. These questions were, for young Mengden, 
still in the gymnasium, far from being purely academic. He saw them in the per-
spective of life and death, and all the more so, since he was in the grip of most 
serious thoughts following the recent death of his best friend. 
The young student did not so much as suspect that Darwin was the wrong man 
to provide answers to those questions. They demanded philosophical depth for 
which Darwin had no eyes.2 He did not even care to clear up the muddle in which 
he had been about purposiveness in nature and about the nature of the human 
mind.3 Much less did he want to part from his tactic to appear a mere agnostic in-
stead of what he had really been for many ycars--a plain materialist.4 Only with 
this in mind can one see the thrust of the summary of Darwin's view on evolution 
and theology which he had asked his son, Francis, to send on his behalf to the 
young student: 
r am much engaged, an old man, and out of health, and I cannot spare 
time to answer your questions fully--nor indeed can they be answered. 
Science has nothing to do with Christ, except insofar as the habit of 
scientific research makes a man cautious in admitting evidence. For 
myself, I do not believe that there ever has been any revelation. As for 
future life, every man mus t judge for himself between conflicting vague 
probabilities. 
The significance of that summary should be easy to see. ft is typical of the 
views that prevail about Christ and revelation in a culture that first and foremost 
claims to be scientific. The summary also reveals the most vulnerable point of that 
empiricism by which our secularist culture lays so great a store. Within that em-
piricism, the highest premium is put on caution which familiari ty with scientific 
method should generate about facts. Yet the same empiricism has not failed to pro-
mote a crude discrimination among various kinds of facts. In particular, it fostered 
studied neglect about the facts of history which, unlike the data science deals with, 
do not repeat themselves. Undoubtedly, the most towering among those facts is 
Christ and the religious history that centers on Him. 
Darwin's remark about Christ is about a hundred years old. Then, in the 1870s, 
the secularization of the Western World was in a fairly advanced stage. Yet, the 
process was still largely intellectual, carried out mostly by an exploitation of sci-
ence for materialistic and agnostic ideologies. Secularization was far less advanced 
in the realm of morals. In the Western World the principles of Christian morality 
still prevailed, in public at least, although the first attacks on the indissolubility of 
marriage had already been successfully carried out. Immorality, in its various 
fonns, was widely practiced, but not publicly condoned, let alone approved by leg-
islation as is done today. 
Today secularization is complete both intellectually and morally. Christian mo-
rality is openly flouted while immorality is supported by civil legislation. As to 
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Christ, secular scholarship no longer grants Hirn a major historic role, let alone a 
divine status. He is just one of the major religious figures. 
In this very secularist world of ours, not a few Christian theologians write and 
speak as if they lived in an unreal world. This is particularly true of their writings 
about a cosmic Christ, so prominent in the letters of Paul. What is the true value of 
those writings, one may ask, if they contain so little about the cosmos, the real cos-
mos, which is now spectacularly investigated by science? 
Theologians still have to learn that the science of the cosmos or lllliversc de-
mands more than theological perspectives, let alone mere theological rhetoric. The 
lllliversc is the totality of hard, exact, empirical facts that demand more for their 
handling than gcxxl intentions and pious words. 
Our question here is whether there are some major facts of the history of sci-
ence that can be correlated with orthodox historical Christology and whether they 
can be satisfactorily explained without it. There is at least one such monumental 
fact. It is the fact of the birth of science in the fourteenth century. That century, let 
us recall, had preceded by three hundred years the century of Galileo and Newton 
to which that birth is usually assigned. 
That birth is a most monumental historical fact. Having taken place in medieval 
Christian Western Europe, it still assures a leading role to the Western World. The 
present political transformation illustrates this all too well . Behind perestroika and 
glasnost there lies the recognition of what President Reagan put in a memorable 
phrase in London on June 5, 1989: ·The Goliath of totalitarianism will be brought 
down by the David of microchip.M' In other words, the Soviet Union is suing for 
peace because today it is technologically and scientifically far more behind the 
West than it was thirty years ago. 
One may also ask the question: Would there be a Western World today if sci-
ence had been born in ancient China, India, Egypt, Babylon, Greece or even among 
the Arabs? In all those cultures there was plenty of talent and they could boast of 
some promising discoveries. It is enough to think of the discovery of the magnet in 
China, of the decimal system in India, of phonetic writing in Egypt, of Euclidean 
geometry in ancient Greece. But none of those cultures produced science. In all of 
them science suffered a monumental stillbirth.6 
This leads to the next question: What is science? Science is the empirico-quan-
.itative investigation of things in motion. That this is so is demonstrated by each 
md every branch of physics, the most exact of all sciences. Gravitation is the study 
1f bodies accelerated in a gravitational field; electricity and optics are the study of 
1e motion of photons; thermodynamics is the study of the flow of heat and of the 
mdom motion of atoms and molecules. In atomic and nuclear physics we study 
1e interaction of elementary particles, a study demanding ever-larger accelerators. 
Ultimately, all those studies are based on Newton's three laws of motion: the 
w of inertial motion, the law of the equality of action with reaction, and the law 
uch equates force with the product of acceleration with mass. Of these, the law 
inertial motion is the first, conceptually as well as historically. 
The birth of science can therefore be seen as the birth of the first formulation of 
law of inertial motion. The first to formulate it was John Buridan, professor at 
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the Sorborme around 1330. He did so in his commentaries on Aristotle's Physics 
and On the Heavens. In both of those works, motion is explained in terms of a con-
tinual contact of the mover with the moved. Aristotle mentions favorably the idea 
that a projectile keeps moving because the air separated by its motion closes in be-
hind it and thereby keeps pushing it forward. Were this true, there would be no 
need for gasoline to drive automobiles. 
Behind Aristotle's sympathy for this idea lies his pantheism. For Aristotle, any 
motion on earth is a continuation of the motion of the celestial sphere which in 
turn keeps moving because of its contact, through desire, with the Prime Mover. 
The latter is never spoken of by Aristotle as a Creator. On three occasions, Aris-
totle rejected the idea of creation out of nothing, an idea incompatible with panthe-
ism in which the world is necessarily eternal. The Aristotelian cosmos can have no 
beginning either ontologically or temporally. 
Buridan's explanation of motion could not have been more un-Aristotelian. He 
spoke of the start of motion in terms of an impetus given to a body. What he meant 
by impetus was a quantity of motion or momentum in modem scientific terminol-
ogy. He also emphasized the resistance of the air. He noted: 
... one who wishes to jump a long distance drops back a way in order to 
run faster, so that by running he might acquire an impetus which would 
carry him a longer distance in the jump. Whence the person so running 
and jumping does not feel the air moving him, but rather feels the air in 
front strongly resisting him.7 
This passage introduces an epoch-making cosmological message steeped in a theo-
logical perspective. The latter will inconvenience only those who, with Popper, re-
peat that all science is cosmology• and, again with him, fail to ponder the begin-
ning of science as a study of things in motion, including their totality which is the 
cosmos or universe. It is no accident that, due to his anti-metaphysical and anti-
theological perspective, Popper took the expansion of the universe for a most 
doubtful idea.9 Jn that perspective one can only falsify propositions, scientific or 
other, but never assert their truth. Fortunately for the future of science, Buridan 
had a confidence in scientific truth because he held firmly the ultimate truth about 
the cosmos or its createdness. To continue with him: 
Since the Bible does not state that appropriate intelligences move the 
celestial bodies, it could be said that it does not appear necessary to posi t 
intelligences of this kind, because it would be answered that God, when 
He created the world, moved each of the celestial orbs as He pleased, and 
in moving them He impressed in them impetuses which moved them 
without His having to move them any more except by the method of 
general influence whereby He concurs as co-agent in all things which take 
place; on the seventh day He rested from all work which He had 
executed by committing to others the actions and the passions in turn ... 
And these impetuses, which He impressed in the celestial bodies, were 
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not decreased nor corrupted afterwards because there was no inclination 
of the celestial bodies for other movements. Nor was there resistance 
which could be corruptive or repressive of that impetus. But this I do not 
say assertively, but rather tentatively so that I might seek from the 
theological masters what they might teach me in these matters as to how 
these things take place. 10 
The theological masters said nothing, which is always a good idea when they 
are confronted with a proposition which is not theological but scientific. The impe-
tus theory, as further developed by Nicole Oresme, the successor of Buridan and 
the future bishop of Lisieux, became a major success at the Sorbonne. 11 From there 
it was carried to all universities in late-medieval Europe. Copernicus learned about 
it as a student at the University of Cracow and later used it as an explanation of the 
dynamical problems created by the earth's motion. 
Galileo held the impetus theory in the same form, namely, that the inertial mo-
tion of celestial bodies has to be circular. It was Descartes who first formally 
stated that all inertial motion has to be linear, a point which Newton borrowed. 
However, the all-important conceptual breakthrough was not the shift from circu-
lar to linear inertia, but rather from motion through continual contact with the 
mover to motion with no further contact with the mover once the latter had pro-
vided the initial impetus. 
The birth of science, insofar as it is inconceivable without the birth of the idea 
of inertial motion, has, as shown by Buridan's very words, explicit connection 
with the idea of creation out of nothing which only a personal, infinitely perfect 
Creator can perform. Only through such a creation can the universe enjoy a very 
specific kind of autonomy. This is not the autonomy of a necessarily existing eter-
nal universe which invariably inspired an a priori approach to its regularities and 
has therefore stifled interest in empirical investigations. (Herein lies the true rea-
son for those stillbirths of science in all ancient cultures.) The autonomy in ques-
tion is rather a property given to the universe. As something given, it represents 
one of an infinite number of possible sets of laws, of so many possible autonomies. 
Since none of them can be derived on an a priori basis, the actual existence of any 
of them can but invite empirical investigation, an idea indispensable for scientific 
research. 
It now remains to unfold the deeper aspects of the idea of creation out of noth-
ing as held by Buridan, Oresme, Copernicus, Descartes, Galileo and Newton him-
self. It was a very Christian idea both in its origin and in its safeguards. The first 
point to note is that, apart from the Second Book of Maccabees, the Old Testament 
only implies the idea of creation out of nothing but does not teach it explicitly .12 
The idea of creation out of nothing was born within a New Testament frame-
work. The starting point is Paul's doctrine of Christ as the Son in whom the Father 
creates everything. By assigning to Christ the work of creation, Paul wanted to 
emphasize His equality with the Father to whom the Old Testament attributes the 
::hief prerogative of creation. If, however, the Son is co-equal with the Father, the 
miverse can be but a mere creature, however supreme. 
66 Jaki 
Similarly, John refers to Christ as the Father's .. only begotten" or monogenes 
(unigenitus) in whom all were created and without whom nothing that exists has 
come into being (John 1 :3). The impact which the word monogenes had for the 
dogmatic specification of Christ as consubstantial with the Father is well known. 
Much less is known of the impact which that word had on the development of the 
Christian view of the universe. The extent of such an impact may be surmised if 
we recall that with the Greeks and Romans the word monogenes (unigenitus) had 
the universe for its supreme reference point. Examples of this can be found in the 
writings of Plato, Plutarch and Cicero, to mention only some major spokesmen of 
classical antiquity.'3 They referred to the universe as the entity that alone was .. be-
gotten" from the divine principle because they saw in it the only genuine emana-
tion from the Supreme Good or Prime Mover. 
The gain that derived for the universe through its being most intimately united 
with the Supreme Good or Prime Mover was only apparent. The diviniz:ation of the 
universe within Plato's or Aristotle's pantheism meant the destruction of the uni-
verse as a coherent entity. Permanence with no change, a chief attribute of divinity, 
could be grafted, not without some arbitrariness, only to the realm of the fixed 
stars. Already the realm immediately below it, the realm of the planets (including 
the sun and the moon) suggested by its changes a departure from divine, that is, 
unchanging rationality. This was implied in the word planet, which in its Greek 
form stands for an erratically wandering body. As to the terrestrial realm, not a few 
changes within it could easily appear the embodiment of partial irrationality. Such 
a non-uniformly rational universe could not invite the kind of scientific investiga-
tion which is summed up in the phrase, .. all science is cosmology," insofar as this 
means that the same rational laws are valid throughout the entire universe. 
It should be obvious that the understanding of the universe had to be very dif-
ferent in the Christian context in which a flesh and blood human being is consid-
ered as the only begotten Son of a Divine Father essentially different from the uni-
verse. This is not to suggest that Christians did not admire the universe. For them--
the first chapter of Paul's letter to the Romans is a most memorable instance--the 
universe is the chief evidence of the Creator himself. For all that, as I have stated 
elsewhere, 
... with Christians, inspired not by abstract theologoumena but by a most 
vivid vision of a most tangible only begotten Son of God, the universe 
could not retain its hallowed status as a .. begetting" from the .. divine,'' 
that is, the status befitting an entity sharing divine nature. With Christians 
the universe had to remain a mere creature. This had to be so in spite of 
the comprehensiveness of all created perfections that made for Christians 
the notion of the universe the most exalted notion conceivable apart from 
that of God Almighty.•• 
This exalted status of the notion of the universe is implied in all forms of Christian 
creed. They all predicate the existence of God on the existence of .. heaven and 
earth" or the existence of that universe which is a comprehensive totality. Greater 
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than that totality even God himself could not have created, so Aquinas declared 
with his always economic use of an economy largely lost on most post-
Vatican II Although they often claim to be the heirs to the thinking of 
John Henry Newman, they still have to emulate his disarmingly plain dicta such 
as, ·there is but one thought greater than that of the universe and that is the thought 
of its Maker."16 
To recall Newman is especially appropriate in view of his studies of the Arian 
heresy and of his warnings that pantheism was to be the great conceit of the times 
to come. 17 Curiously, Newman, so able to read between the lines, called no atten-
tion to the idea which Arius must have had about the universe, that is, to his cos-
mology. The fact is all the more curious because Newman begins his chapter on 
Arian heresy with a recollection of Sozomenes remark that ·Arius was the first to 
introduce into the Church the formulae of the 'out of nothing,' and the 'once He 
was not,' that is, the creation and the non-eternity of the Son of God. " 11 
Newman should have pointed out that the formula ·out of nothing" (ek ouk on-
ton, de nihilo) entered Christian parlance four generations before Arius, in the sec-
ond half of the second century, through the writings of Athenagoras and Tertullian. 
They resorted to that formula in order to make absolutely clear that the universe 
did not arise out of an unformed matter, eternally co-existing with God. The speci-
fication of the universe as something created out of nothing had, by the time of 
Arius, a standard feature of theological parlance, a fact of which Arius could not 
be wiaware. His reference to Christ as a being made out of nothing (Newman notes 
that the were quickly called ·Exoukontii"19) was a radical departure from 
an already hallowed restriction of that expression to the creation of the universe 
out of nothing. 
The reaction to Arius was prompt and most animated. But, as is usually the 
case, the reaction had implicit and explicit aspects because of the presence of such 
aspects in the provocation. The explicitness related to what was startlingly new, 
namely, to the Christological bearing of Arius's innovation. Implicit in Arius's 
ioctrine was the ultimate fate which was in store for the understanding of the uni-
·erse in Arius's demotion of Christ from the rank of the truly only begotten being 
J that of a mere creature, however exalted. 
Of course, Arius claimed to retain the notion of the Father as a true Creator. But 
; far as can be reconstructed from his statements, he carefully avoided probing 
to the problem of whether Christ as a mere creature could still be the Father's 
;trument for creating out of nothing the universe of beings of which He was one. 
e Christ of Arius could onJy be a demiourgos or a mere shaper of a matter yet 
;haped but already existing. 
In view of Arius's strategy, that of careful concealment, he could not be ex-
ted to probe into the ulterior effect of his applying the expression monogenes to 
ist as a mere creature. Still, because of the classic pagan use of that Lenn, 
IS's step should have seemed fateful. Its ultimate aim was to make Christianity 
ptable to the Hellenistic world, a world still pagan for the most part. It was no 
lent that bishops eager to cozy up to Constantine's establishment, more pagan 
Christian, tried to prevent the condemnation of Arius. Yet, if that condemna-
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tion had been prevented, Christianity would have run a most serious risk of being 
transformed into a form of pantheism; first into its refined version already ex-
pounded by Plotinus, and then into its crudely animistic Porphyrian form. 
Harnack did not see beneath the surface when he stated that had Arius not been 
resisted Christianity would have quickly been reduced to an obscure Jewish sect. 
As such it would have remained monotheistic, for a while at least. Most likely, 
Christianity would have become a welcome place for kabbalism with its pantheis-
tic ramifications. It was in monotheistic Jewish ambience, which so resolutely op-
posed God's self-revelation in Christ, that kabbala flourished from Patristic times 
on. It is also a fact, acknowledged in standard Jewish encyclopedias,20 that Jewish 
intelligentsia has, by and large, espoused pantheism. Spinoza and Einstein were no 
accidents in that respect. 
It was well said that the Christology or soteriology of Athanasius is ontological 
and that of Arius is voluntarist.21 It was also well said by Harnack that in both 
cases there is an underlying cosmology.22 Curiously, he said nothing about those 
respective cosmologies insofar as they related not so much to the moral as to the 
physical world, where cosmology ultimately and primarily belongs. Yet, whatever 
the paucity of sources about Arius, they strongly suggest that underlying his volun-
tarist scheme of salvation there was a Stoic cosmology with its succession of 
worlds as places for the soul's purification. 
About such worlds the most important thing to note is that they cannot consti -
tute a fully-ordered totality. Herein lies a fact long overlooked. The pagan Greeks, 
who coined the word cosmos for the universe (to pan) failed to speak of the uni-
verse as a fully-ordered entity. Order was conspicuously absent in Democritus's 
cosmology and in the cosmology of subsequent atomists, such as the Epicureans. 
The universe of the Stoics was subject to periodic conflagrations, hardly a mark of 
orderliness. Plato's universe was perfect only in its heavenly sections. The sublu-
nary world was, according to Plato, only partly ordered. The same is true about 
Aristotle's universe. There is the more disorder in Plotinus's emanationist universe 
the farther it leads from the One. 
Herein lies one of the reasons why science failed to arise among the Greeks of 
old. If all science is cosmology, then all true scientific laws must be equally, that 
is, consistently valid throughout the universe. In other words, science makes sense 
only if the universe is uniformly ordered. This is an idea that could not arise within 
Greek paganism or pantheism. 
But the idea of a consistently or fully-ordered universe was a natural conse-
quence of orthodox Christology. In fact, the idea of a fully-ordered universe played 
a pivotal part in Athanasius's discourses on the true divinity of the Logos. A truly 
divine Logos, in Whom the Father created all, so Athanasius insisted time an( 
again, could not produce a partially disordered universe. 
Thus, at the very beginning of part two of his Contra genres, Athanasius calle 
attention to the difference between God's essential invisibility and man's inabilit 
to comprehend anything not mediated through the visible. That man's knowledt 
of God be worthy of a perfect God, God gave a perfect order to the physical ur 
verse. God achieved this objective by consigning the work of creation to f 
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Word, that is, to His infinitely perfect Son. Or, to quote Athanasius's very words: 
"For this God by His own word gave the Universe the Order it has, in or-
der that since He is by nature invisible, men might be enabled to know Him at any 
rate by His works. "23 Shortly afterwards Athanasius states again: "God so ordered 
Creation that although He is by nature invisible He may yet be known by His 
works." 
In chapters 35, 36 and 37, Athanasius lists various examples of order in the 
physical universe and begins chapter 38 with the affirmation: 
Since then, there is everywhere not disorder but order, proportion and not 
disproportion, not disarray but arrangement, and that in an order perfectly 
harmonious we needs must infer and be led to perceive the Master that 
put together and compacted all things, and produced harmony in them. 
Athanasius brings that chapter to a close with the argument that only when there is 
no trace of cosmic disorder, that is, "when the order of the whole universe being 
perfectly harmonious .. .it is consistent to think that the Rule and King of all Crea-
tion is one and not many." 
Athanasius also finds in the perfect order of the universe a proof of the perfect 
unity between the Father and the Word. Furthermore, in chapter 40 he uses the 
same argument as a proof of the divinity of the Word: "If the universe subsist in 
reason and wisdom and skill and is perfectly ordered throughout, it follows that He 
that is over it and has ordered it is none other than the Word of God." In chapter 
42, Athanasius describes in detail the creative action of the Word inasmuch as it 
issues in cosmic order. The final product, to quote his words, is a "marvelous and 
truly divine harmony." 
The Contra genres and the De /ncarnatione (which begins with a reference to 
the same arguments as set forth in the former work) were widely read works. As 
such, they greatly strengthened the effectiveness of the Christological dogmas to 
form a cultural climate favorable to science. This is not to suggest that one could 
distill specific scientific laws from Christology. That would have been contrary to 
the subtly recondite manner in which God offers his revealed truths. Supernatural 
truths do not create natural truths; they rather presuppose them and effectively 
though subtly help the full unfolding of their potentialities. 
A Christian--the best Scholastic theologians are a case--could very well remain 
on the rather low level of Aristotelian science. Imbued with Christological dogmas 
those Scholastics would not repeal with Aristotle, let alone with Plotinus, that the 
world was ordered only partially. In fact, Christian belief in the Creator led, in the 
case of Philoponus, to the recognition that a true order has to be uniformly valid. 
Many had noticed before him the various colors of the stars; but led by that belief 
in the Creator, he took those colors for a proof that the material of stars was not 
different from ordinary matter.24 If, however, this was the case, the heavenly bod-
ies had to be governed by the same laws that governed bodies on earth. 
Such was one of those indirect ways in which belief in the createdness of all 
matter could prepare minds to treat in the same way the heavenly and terrestrial 
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regions. Had such preparation not been al work in the minds of Buridan and 
Oresme, they would not have been ready to discuss in the same breath the motion 
of celestial bodies and a mere jwnp on earth. Thus was prepared, in a remote man-
ner, the way for Newton's assertion that the fall of an apple and the fall of the 
moon in its orbit obeyed the same time-squared law of free fall. 
Clearly, Whitehead fell far short of the truth when, in placing the origin of mod-
em science in the Middle Ages, he spoke only of the emphasis laid by the Scholas-
tics on rationality.2' The truth about that Scholastic rationality is far richer and 
deeper. ll is not an ordinary rationality but a respect for reason that derives from 
belief in the divinity of the incarnate Logos. 
Since the times of Francis of Assisi, it has become customary to celebrate the 
birth of that Logos as a man with emphasis on the human charm embodied in it. 
There is nothing inappropriate in that, as the divine Logos chose lo begin His ap-
pearance among us as a helpless babe. Helpless as He could appear in his human 
birth, the event meant the coming of the Creator of the universe and with it, in the 
long run at least, the coming of science as well. The intrinsic connection between 
these two comings is attested also by the fact that they become a blessing only if 
embraced with profound humility and with a deep sense of responsibility. 
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